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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 December 1952

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STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 283 (Second Revision)

SUBJECT: Program of Estimates through 1953

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the IAC, dated 5 May 1952, subject:  
Program of Estimates for Remainder of 1952

I. WORK IN PROCESS.

1. The Office of National Estimates has the following estimates in process, which it proposes to complete by the dates noted:

- a. NIE-45: Probable Free World Attitudes in the East-West Conflict, through Mid-1954. 15 January 1953.
- b. NIE-56: Likelihood of Loss of Important Economic Resources of the Far East. 15 December 1952.
- c. NIE-59: Relative Strategic Importance of East-West Trade to the Soviet Bloc and to the Rest of the World. 31 December 1952.

DOCUMENT NO. 42  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ©  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 13/2/80 REVIEWER: 18360

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
- d. NIE-63: France's Prospective Ability to Play a Major Role in the Western Security System.  
31 December 1952.
- e. NIE-64 (Part I) Supplement: Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1953. 15 December 1952.
- f. NIE-65: Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957.  
28 February 1953.
- g. NIE-71: Probable Developments in Italy. 15 January 1953.
- h. NIE-73: Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security. 31 December 1952.
- i. NIE-74: Probable Developments in Burma through 1953. 31 December 1952.
- j. NIE-76: Probable Developments in Egypt. 31 January 1953.
- k. NIE-77: Probable Developments in Indonesia.  
31 January 1953.
- l. NIE-78: Estimate of Soviet Intentions over the Next Decade. 15 December 1952.

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II. UNSCHEDULED ESTIMATES.

2. The Board realizes that a program drawn up at this time will not cover all situations on which estimates will be required during 1953. Various developments will, from time to time, necessitate the initiation of new estimates on a priority basis. The policy needs of the new Administration may even require a major reformulation of the estimative program. For these reasons, the program outlined below represents the minimum rather than the maximum amount of preliminary scheduling considered advisable at this time.

III. RE-EXAMINATION OF EXISTING ESTIMATES.

3. The following subjects, previously estimated, should be re-examined (wherever possible as slants on existing estimates):

- a. Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action (through Mid-1955). There is need for a standardized Soviet Bloc estimate, published

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annually with an agreed format, which shall serve as the authoritative intelligence basis for budget purposes, NATO planning, etc. Unlike NIE-25 and NIE-64, new periodic examinations should represent a two year projection, i.e., through the fiscal year (1955) for which US policies and programs are made during the last half of 1953. Completion date: 30 June 1953.

- b. East Germany: The present estimate expires at the end of 1952. Completion date: 31 January 1953.
- c. Eastern European Satellites: The present estimate expires in mid-1953. Completion date: 31 March 1953.
- d. Korea: The present estimate expires in mid-1953. Completion date: 30 April 1953.
- e. Indochina: The present estimate expires in mid-1953. Completion date: 31 May 1953.
- f. India: The present Indian estimate, completed in 1951, has become obsolete. Completion date: 15 February 1953.

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- g. Iran: The present estimate expires at the end of 1953. Completion date: 31 October 1953.
- h. Yugoslavia: The present estimate expires at the end of 1952. Completion date: 15 April 1953.

IV. NEW ESTIMATES.

4. Preparation of estimates on the following subjects is also considered desirable:

- a. Future Orientation of West Germany: An examination of the various long-range economic, political and psychological factors -- internal and external -- which will affect West Germany's future course. Completion date: 31 July 1953.
- b. The United Kingdom: An examination of the various economic and political factors which will determine the UK's future role in Europe, the Middle and Far East, and the East-West struggle generally. Completion date: 30 September 1953.

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- c. Prospects for the Development of Strength and Stability in Western Europe. An examination of trends in Western Europe as a whole and an estimate of their effect upon Western Europe's ability to achieve and maintain strength. Completion date: 30 November 1953.
- d. Probable Developments in Japan. An examination of Japan's immediate economic and political problems and their implications. Completion date: 31 March 1953.
- e. Probable Developments in Greece: Completion date: 30 April 1953.
- f. Israel: An examination of its internal strains and of the various factors affecting Israel's position in the Middle East and in the East-West struggle. Completion date: 31 August 1953.
- g. Probable Developments in Central Africa: An examination of trends and problems in the area between the Sahara and the Union of South Africa. Completion date: 28 February 1953.

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h. Likelihood of the Loss of Important Resources in:

Indian Subcontinent: Completion date:

31 March 1953.

Africa: Completion date: 30 April 1953.

Middle East: Completion date: 31 May 1953.

Latin America: Completion date: 31 July 1953.

V. O/NE ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION.

5. The periodic review of the world situation will be a continuing requirement. In April of this year the Board completed action on an "Estimate of the World Situation through 1953", and in November it completed action on an "Estimate of the World Situation through 1954." Hereafter this estimate will be done at least annually, and in 1953 the Board plans to complete an "Estimate of the World Situation through 1955" by 1 September 1953.

VI. RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES PROGRAM.

6. The Board recommends that projects of research be undertaken by qualified government agencies or outside institutions in the fields of study noted below. In these fields National

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Intelligence Estimates are essential, but definite information on which to base these estimates is peculiarly inadequate. The Board believes that well-conceived programs of research would provide a surer foundation for future estimates. The Office of National Estimates is prepared to draft terms of reference, \* setting forth the general nature of the information required. It is also prepared to assist in drafting the detailed terms of research projects, and to discuss the allocations of these projects with appropriate agencies or institutions.

- a. The Present and Potential Strength of Communist China: Estimates written during 1951 and 1952 have been hampered by a lack of solid and recent data on the political, economic and military situation in China. Pursuant to the post-mortem on SE-27, steps toward the improvement of economic intelligence on Communist China have already been taken. Similar steps need to be undertaken in the political and military fields.

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\* An example of such terms of reference, on the subject of Communist China, is attached as Appendix B.

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b. Special Soviet Economic Problems: Adequate national intelligence effort has not yet been given to such problems as the location of Soviet industry, the degree of industrial concentration in geographic areas, the extent of regional self-sufficiency and interdependence, the Soviet transportation system, the stockpiling program, industrial bottlenecks, critical commodities in short supply, local and over-all vulnerabilities. Study of these subjects will assist in making estimates of over-all Soviet intentions and estimates of capabilities and intentions in particular areas (e.g., a study of the Soviet Far East as an aid in estimating Communist policy in Asia). They will assist in formulating national policies on a variety of subjects, including trade controls, war plans, weapons development, etc.

c. Soviet Air Offensive and Defensive Capabilities: Despite continuing attention to these subjects, serious problems still exist. One such problem is that of acquiring the kind of data which permits adequate quantitative estimates, i.e., the

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kind of data which will permit an estimate, not alone of technical capacity, but of actual production and effective use by operational units.

Another problem is that of converting these estimates into meaningful terms and setting forth their implications for US security.

- d. Soviet Capabilities for Conducting Warfare by Unconventional Means: Continuing studies in the fields of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, guided missiles, biological and chemical weapons, electronic measures, or other unconventional weapons (including sabotage and other clandestine warfare) are required. These studies, where appropriate, should cover production and effective operational use as well as levels of technical achievement.

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APPENDIX A

RECAPITULATION OF SCHEDULE

Completion

December 1 - 15	NIE-56	Far East Resources
	NIE-64 (I)	Supplement
	SE-34	Albania
December 15 - 31	NIE-59	East-West Trade
	NIE-63	France
	NIE-73	Middle East
	NIE-74	Burma
	NIE-78	Longview
January 1 - 15	NIE-45	Free World Attitudes
	NIE-71	Italy
January 15 - 31	NIE-76	Egypt
	NIE-77	Indonesia
	-	East Germany
February	NIE-65	Soviet Capabilities through mid-1957
	-	India
	-	Central Africa

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March	Eastern European Satellites Japan Indian Subcontinent Resources
April	Korea Greece African Resources Yugoslavia
May	Indochina Middle East Resources
June	Soviet Capabilities and Courses of Action through Mid-1955
July	West Germany Latin America Resources
August	Israel Estimate of the World Situation
September, October, November, December	UK Western Europe Iran Various estimates to be initiated under paragraph 6

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GENERAL GUIDE TO RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON COMMUNIST CHINA

THE PROBLEM

To examine the various components of Communist China's national strength, in order to provide a basis for estimating the power potential of Communist China through 1960.

ASSUMPTION

Communist China does not become involved in a general war in the Far East, or in a global war, during the period of this estimate.

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I. POLITICAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

A. Objectives. What political objectives of the CC regime are significant in relation to the present and future power potential of the regime? What programs and policies are now in operation, or planned, to achieve these objectives? What relative priority do these various objectives have?

1. Internal objectives (such as total control of the state by the CCP, and socialization of society).
2. Programs and policies to support internal objectives.  
(Where applicable include military and economic measures designed to support political objectives, and the interplay of these measures and objectives with military and economic objectives)
3. External objectives (such as aspirations with respect to the USSR, to Asian CP's, Asian governments, and the West)
4. Programs and policies to support external objectives

B. Factors Which Will Condition Peiping's Ability to Achieve Its Desired Objectives

To what extent and in what manner will such factors as the following affect the regime's ability to mobilize, direct, and exploit the people of China in its attempt to achieve the above objectives? What trends are important in this respect?

1. The status and function of the CCP.
  - a. Extent and pattern of CCP domination of the government, economy, and society.

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- b. The nature of the CCP's doctrinal relationship and orientation with respect to the CPSU; with respect to Asian CP's. The ability of the CCP to reconcile domestic and world communist demands
  - c. The effectiveness of intra-party discipline in the CCP. The extent, if any, of doctrinal or personal <sup>in</sup> divergencies with the CCP. The problem of Mao Tse-tung's succession.
  - d. The emergence, if any, of a CCP managerial and bureaucratic elite.
  - e. The status and function of non-CP personalities and organizations in the government, the economy, and society.
2. Problems of governmental administration
- a. Problems of trained leadership
  - b. Problems of corruption and inefficiency
  - c. Effectiveness of revenue collection
  - d. Control over production
  - e. Regionalism vs. centralism
  - f. Ethnic and religious problems
  - g. The cost of the bureaucracy
3. The extent and nature of coercion as a method of exploiting human resources, and the relative emphasis placed by the regime on various instruments and techniques of control.

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- a. Physical coercion
  - (1) Instrument and techniques
  - (2) Extent and effectiveness
- b. Political and psychological coercion
  - (1) Instruments and techniques
  - (2) Extent and effectiveness
- c. Economic coercion for political ends
  - (1) Instruments and techniques
  - (2) Extent and effectiveness
- 4. The force of popular attitudes
  - a. The extent to which the regime must consider traditional forms, popular prejudices and popular aspirations in determining and implementing policy.
  - b. The extent and nature of discontent within the CP, the Army, and among non-CP officials and the general population regarding:
    - (1) the CP, the government, the Army
    - (2) the rapid communization of society
    - (3) the Korean war
    - (4) the USSR, the US, the Chinese Nationalists, Japan
  - The extent, nature, and prospect of effective discontent
  - c. The effect upon the above attitudes of special regional, class, ethnic, or age considerations.
- 5. The effect of economic influences on political objectives.
  - a. Prolonged support of hostilities in Korea



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- b. Development and prolonged support of large modernized armed forces.
  - c. Prolonged austerity programs.
  - d. Precipitous efforts to collectivize agriculture.
  - e. Prolonged frustration of economic development plans.
  - f. Others
6. The effect of external influences on political objectives
- a. Relations with the USSR
  - b. Relations with the West
  - c. Relations with Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and India
  - d. Prolonged frustration of foreign policy aspirations
  - e. Others
7. Others

II. ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

- A. Objectives. What economic objectives of the CC regime are significant in relation to the present and future power potential of the regime? What program and policies are now in operation, or planned, to achieve these objectives?
- 1. Economic objectives
    - a. Over-all and by economic sectors
    - b. Relative priorities
  - 2. Programs and policies to support these objectives

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- a. Internal programs (Where applicable include military and political measures designed to support economic objectives, and the interplay of these measures and objectives with political and military objectives)
- b. Foreign programs (Where applicable include military and political measures designed to support economic objectives, and the interplay of these measures and objectives with political and military objectives)
  - (1) With respect to the USSR and the Soviet Bloc.
  - (2) With respect to Japan.
  - (3) With respect to other Asian states.
  - (4) With respect to the West.

B. Conditioning Factors

To what extent and in what manner will such factors as the following affect the regime's ability to mobilize, direct, and exploit the human and economic resources of China in its attempt to achieve the above objectives? What trends are important in this respect?

- 1. Significant details of the functional aspects of the CC economy, current and anticipated.
  - a. Economic organization and administration
  - b. Administrative control of industry

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- c. Planning, preparation, and control
  - d. Financial and fiscal system
  - e. Internal distributive facilities
  - f. Others
- 2. Development of human resources (demographic considerations; size and occupational distribution; scientific, technical, and other specialized skills and training)
  - 3. Rate of growth of industrial production and productive capacity
    - a. Capital goods
    - b. Military end-items
    - c. Consumer goods
  - 4. Rate of growth of agricultural production
  - 5. Rate of growth of mining, extraction and processing
  - 6. Development of economic services
    - a. Transportation facilities
    - b. Transportation facilities into China, particularly the Trans-Siberian Railroad
    - c. Communications
    - d. Electric power
    - e. Others
  - 7. Developments in foreign and domestic commerce
  - 8. The over-all impact of the Korean war on Communist China's economy, and prospects for over-all economic growth in 1960

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III. MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

A. Objectives. What military objectives (in terms of development of armed forces -- not in terms of military operations outside CC) of the CC regime are significant in relation to the present and future power potential of CC? What programs and policies are now in operation or planned in an effort to achieve these objectives?

1. Objectives
2. Programs and policies

B. Conditioning Factors. To what extent or in what manner will such factors as the following affect the regime's ability to mobilize, direct, and exploit the people and resources of China in its effort to achieve the above objectives?

1. Political strengths and weaknesses
2. Economic strengths and weaknesses
3. Dependence on the USSR for equipment, supplies, and technical assistance

IV. COMMUNIST CHINA'S NATIONAL STRENGTH AND POWER POTENTIAL

A. Taking into account the components of total national strength, the objectives set, and the conditioning considerations discussed above, what is China's total power potential at the present time, in terms of China's ability to:

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1. Maintain domestic controls?
  2. Carry out each of its desired domestic objectives?
  3. Pursue a more independent foreign policy?
  4. Coerce or induce the neighboring countries of Asia into closer relations with the Soviet Bloc?
  5. Support the Korean war at present, or at expanded levels?
  6. Support more actively indigenous Communist activities in non-Communist Asia?
  7. Undertake invasions of Taiwan and/or Southeast Asia?
  8. Support a general war in the Far East?
- B. Assuming that China does not in the meantime become involved in large-scale military operations elsewhere in Asia, or in a general war in the Far East, what will be China's total power potential in 1960, in terms of each of the (8) above contingencies affecting the security interests of the US?

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